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This paper studies the determinants of Edgeworth Cycles, price leadership and co-
ordination in retail gasoline markets using daily station-level price data for 110 markets
in Ontario, Canada for 2007-2008. We ﬁnd an “inverse-U” relationship between mar-
kets’ propensity to exhibit price cycles and their size. More concentrated markets are
less likely to exhibits cycles and we highlight regional clustering among cycling and
non-cycling markets. Within cycling markets, we ﬁnd brands’ stations (Esso, Shell,
Petro-Canada, Sunoco) lead price jumps and coordinate market prices, while indepen-
dents (Ultramar, Pioneer, Olco, MacEwen) aggressively undercut prices over the cycle.
Keywords: Retail gasoline prices; Edgeworth Cycles; Price leadership; Coordination
JEL Codes: L11, L9, D22
∗We are grateful to Dustin Coupal of GasBuddy Organization Inc. for providing the data used in this
study, and to Fred Crane for many discussions over the operation of the Canadian retail gasoline market.
Mick Coelli, Herb Emery, Joe Hirschberg, Sacha Kapoor, Harry J. Paarsch and Lawrence Uren have provided
various helpful suggestions, as have seminar participants at the University of Melbourne and the University
of Calgary. David Byrne thanks the University of Melbourne for funding. The views and opinions expressed
in this paper do not reﬂect those of the GasBuddy Organization Inc.1 Introduction
Empirical research on gasoline markets has recently exploited high-frequency, daily station-
level price data across many markets to deepen our understanding of retail gasoline price
dynamics. Lewis (2009), Doyle et. al (2010) and Lewis (2011) show variation in the presence
of retail gasoline price cycles across markets is systematically related to market structure:
highly concentrated markets and markets with small shares of non-branded gasoline stations
are less likely to exhibit price cycles.1 Since retail gasoline price cycles resemble Edgeworth
Cycles from Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) oligopoly model, this framework serves as the com-
petitive benchmark for examining linkages between pricing dynamics and market structure.2
Wang (2009) and Lewis (2011) further study the mechanism that generates price cycles
empirically, ﬁnding that price leadership and coordination amongst branded retailers facil-
itates both short term price commitments (as in Maskin and Tirole (1988)) and periodic
market-wide price jumps (“or restorations”) over cycles. Wang (2009) exploits the intro-
duction of a 2001 price regulation in Perth, Australia that increases gas stations’ risk in
initiating price jumps to identify price leadership amongst brands. BP stations collectively
lead almost every price jump pre-regulation, whereas the three major brands’ (BP, Caltex
and Shell) share the leadership role post-regulation by randomizing whose stations initiate
price jumps. Lewis (2011) ﬁnds evidence that Speedway is a price leader across cycling cities
in the Midwestern U.S. who signals price jumps and coordinates its stations’ prices to induce
market-wide price coordination within and across cities.3
In this paper, we develop new empirical results over the determinants of price cycles, and
the role of price leadership and coordination in generating cycles, using a unique dataset of
1Respectively, these three papers use data from 85, 115 and 165 U.S. cities. Eckert (2002) and Noel
(2007a) obtain similar results based on weekly gasoline price data across a smaller number of cities (19) in
Canada. “Brand” retailers are typically classiﬁed as large ﬁrms with many stations across many markets
who are vertically integrated with their own oil reﬁneries.
2See Noel (2011) for a comprehensive overview of the empirical literature on Edgeworth Cycles.
3Wang (2008) and Houde and Clark (2011) use case studies from Ballarat, Australia and a price-ﬁxing
case in Qu´ ebec, Canada to show gasoline retailers even depart from competition and tacitly or explicitly
collude to ensure price commitment and coordinate on prices over price cycles.
1daily station-level retail gasoline price observations for 110 local markets in Ontario, Canada
from August 1, 2007 to August 12, 2008. These data have been provided to the authors by
the owners of the GasBuddy Organization Inc. (GasBuddy), and are the universe of price
observations collected by their price reporting websites across these markets over this period.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to exploit high frequency price data
across a large cross section of markets from outside of the U.S. to examine dynamics in
retail gasoline prices. Moreover, our data present an opportunity to examine urban/rural
diﬀerences in pricing dynamics across markets. Whereas previous papers examine cities in
the U.S. (Lewis (2009), Doyle et. al (2010) and Lewis (2011)) and Canada (Eckert (2002)
and Noel (2007a)), our dataset contains both major urban centres and rural locations.4 One
quarter of the markets in our sample have less than 9,000 people. As such, an examination
of pricing dynamics amongst markets in the lower tail of the market size distribution is
a key contribution of this paper. Beyond characterizing the roles of market structure and
coordination in generating price dynamics, our study, as well as those mentioned, importantly
informs anti-trust authorities on how to monitor ﬁrms’ conduct and identify abuses of market
power in retail gasoline markets empirically.
After outlining our data sources and estimation sample in Section 2, we develop our
empirical analysis of the determinants of price cycles in Section 3. We ﬁnd an “inverse-
U” relationship between market size and the probability a market exhibits price cycles.
Complementing the results of Noel (2007a), we show this is driven by two distinct types of
non-cycling cities: small, rural “sticky pricing” markets where retail prices respond sluggishly
to daily ﬂuctuations in wholesale prices, and large, urban “cost-based pricing” markets where
prices move in lock-step with daily wholesale price movements. Market structure also aﬀects
whether price cycles exist, namely more concentrated markets are less likely to exhibit price
cycles. We also ﬁnd evidence that price cycles exist within particular regions of the province:
(1) along Lake Ontario around Kingston in Eastern Ontario; (2) the Niagara Region toward
4The smallest market we can ﬁnd referenced in previous studies is Timmins, Ontario from Eckert (2002)
and Noel (2007a) which has a population of 42,997 people according to the 2006 Canadian Census.
2the New York state border; and (3) in the Southwest toward Windsor and the Michigan
border. Cycling cities also exist in the rural Northern parts of the province, but mainly
among cities along the Trans-Canada highway. Overall, our ﬁndings of urban/rural and
regional eﬀects as key determinants of price cycles, that are obtained from high-frequency
data from a diﬀerent country and sampling method than previously used, re-aﬃrm and build
upon the results from Lewis (2009), Doyle et. al (2010) and Lewis (2011) for the U.S..
In Section 4, we present ﬁndings on price leadership and undercutting intensity across
gas stations run by brands (Esso, Shell, Petro-Canada and Sunoco) and independents (all
other non-brand ﬁrms). We ﬁnd price dispersion amongst retailers is minimized during price
jumps and subsequently rises over the duration of price cycles. Our analysis of stations’ par-
ticipation rates in price restorations shows Esso, Shell, Petro-Canada and Sunoco are active
participants while independent stations run by Ultramar, Pioneer, MacEwen and Mac’s are
less likely to participate. Similar to the ﬁndings over price leadership and coordination from
Australia and the U.S. of Wang (2009) and Lewis (2011), branded ﬁrms in Canada also use
their large market presence to initiate price jumps and coordinating market prices.
We further ﬁnd brand and independent stations exhibit statistically and economically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their price undercutting intensity between price jumps (“the under-
cutting phase”). Following restorations, brands’ stations maintain their prices at or above
market-level averages, simply following average prices as prices decline from their previous
restoration price. In contrast, independent stations run by Ultramar, Pioneer, Olco and
MacEwen are quite aggressive in undercutting prices following restorations. For example,
the day following a restoration, Ultramar and Pioneer undercut the prior restoration price
by an additional 0.58 and 0.43 cents per litre (cpl) beyond the market-level average price
cut of 1.13 cpl. By day seven of the cycle, these ﬁrms undercut the restoration price by 2.83
and 1.43 cpl beyond the market-level average price cut of 3.22 cpl.
32 Data sources
Our primary data source is the universe of daily station-level regular unleaded gason-
line price observations for all cities, towns and villages in the Canadian province of On-
tario collected by GasBuddy from August 1, 2007 to August 12, 2008. These data are
obtained from voluntary, anonymous price spotters who submit prices to GasBuddy’s North
American website (www.gasbuddy.com), provincial website (www.ontariogasprices.com), or
city-speciﬁc websites (i.e., www.torontogasprices.com, www.ottawagasprices.com). Users of
these advertiser-sponsored websites check or report individual station prices using personal
computers and mobile phones. They build user proﬁles by reporting prices, and potentially
win prizes for their eﬀorts. In 2006, the North American GasBuddy website was the most
popular website for searching for gasoline stations’ prices in the U.S. (Lewis and Marvel
(2011)).
While the raw data identiﬁes 403 unique locations, some locations refer to suburbs or
subdivisions within a city.5 We obtain coordinates for each location using name searches in
Google Maps (http://maps.google.ca), and aggregate up “close” locations by deﬁning two or
more locations as being within the same market if the Great Circle Distance between them
is less than 15 kilometres. After aggregating up we obtain 270 local retail gasoline markets.
The estimation sample includes markets with price observations on 250 or more days and
at least 0.5 observations per station per day. These restrictions yield a subsample 595,668
station-price-day observations across 110 markets, which encompass 2,138 stations and 185
unique brands. Keeping with previous studies on the Canadian retail gasoline industry
(Eckert and West (2005)), we deﬁne the large vertically-integrated gas companies, Esso, Shell,
Petro-Canada and Sunoco, to be “brands” and all other stations to be “independents.”6 The
four brands account for 414 (19.36%), 319 (14.92%), 362 (16.93%) and 240 (11.23%) of the
5For example, Amherstview in Kingston, or London North, South, East and West.
6Husky Oil is another branded vertically-integrated gasoline retailer in Canada, however mainly competes
in Western Canadian retail markets. While we observe a small collection of Husky stations in our sample,
Husky’s market presence in Ontario is quite small.
4stations in the estimation sample.
Atkinson (2008b) highlights three sources of sample selection in the GasBuddy data worth
noting from the outset: (1) geographic location (spotters observe more prices for stations in
high-traﬃc areas); (2) station brands (spotters pay more attention to brands’ stations and
less attention to independents’ stations); and (3) relative prices (spotters are more likely
to report prices that are above or below the current average gas price within a city). To
assess the severity of these selection biases, Atkinson (2008b) compares various statistics from
self-collected bi-hourly station-level data and data he recorded from GasBuddy’s websites for
Guelph, Ontario in 2005. Two of his ﬁndings are pertinent for our paper: (1) the daily average
retail price from his high frequency data is well-approximated by the daily average retail
price from the GasBuddy data; and (2) independents’ stations are underreported relative to
brands’ stations. The prior ﬁnding lends credibility to our analysis of the existence of price
cycles, market size and structure in Section 3. The latter ﬁnding requires us to caveat our
results regarding price leadership and undercutting intensity in Section 4.
We also use data on the wholesale (or “rack”) price of gasoline from MJ Ervin and
Associates in our analysis of the determinants of price cycles. These data correspond to the
average rack price amongst non-branded retailers within a market. They are available for
ﬁve major cities in our sample: Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, London and Sarnia. Rack price
locations are matched to GasBuddy locations according to the rack price location that is
closest to a given GasBuddy location in terms of Great Circle Distance.
To account for diﬀerences in demographics across markets, we match our GasBuddy loca-
tions to their corresponding 2006 Canadian Census Subdivision and obtain data on average
household income, fraction of population that drives to work and fraction of population with
post-secondary education. We further retrieve accurate estimates of markets’ population
and urban density from Statistics Canada’s 2006 GeoSuite package.
53 Gasoline price cycles in Ontario
In this section we investigate how market size and structure aﬀects the probability a
market exhibits cycles in its average daily after-tax retail gasoline price.7 The patterns of
interest are depicted in Figures, 1-3, which plot the average daily retail and rack prices
for Goderich (pop. 7,560), St. Thomas (pop. 36,110), and Ajax (pop. 90,160). Figure 1
highlights rigidities in retail price adjustment over time in Goderich as average retail prices
do not move with daily ﬂuctuations in the rack price. Figure 2 shows asymmetric price
cycles that resemble Edgeworth Cycles (Maskin and Tirole (1988)) in St. Thomas. Prices
exhibit a saw-tooth pattern whereby they periodically experience dramatic price increases
(“restorations”) followed by a sequence of daily price declines (“undercutting phase”). Figure
3 shows retail prices move in lock-step with daily ﬂuctuations in the rack price in the city of
Ajax. In the nomenclature of Noel (2007a), these ﬁgures suggest Goderich, St. Thomas and
Ajax exhibit “sticky pricing,” “asymmetric price cycles” and “cost-based pricing.”
Classifying cycling markets
To study the relationship between price cycles, market size and structure, we classify
cycling and non-cycling markets using Lewis (2009)’s simple classiﬁcation rule: if the median
daily change in the average retail price is less than −0.025 cents per litre (cpl) Canadian,
a market exhibits price cycles.8 Intuitively, markets with price cycles should experience
relatively more negative daily average price changes since there are many undercutting phase
days and relatively fewer restoration days. For non-cycling markets, we expect daily price
increases and decreases to cancel each other out over time. For example, in Goderich, St.
Thomas and Ajax the median daily average price changes are 0, -0.299 and 0.012. Figure
7The 2007-2008 excise tax on gasoline in Ontario is 10 cents per litre. The 5% Government Sales Tax is
applied to the pre-excise tax price and the excise tax.
8This classiﬁcation strategy been recently used by Doyle et. al (2010), Lewis (2011) and Lewis and
Noel (2011). Converting our baseline critical price change to U.S. cents per gallon (ignoring diﬀerences in
inﬂation across Canada and the U.S.) yields −0.05 CA cents
litre × 3.7854 litre
1 gallon × 1.0660 US cents
1 CA cents = −0.2018 US cents
gallon .
This compares to a critical price diﬀerence of -0.2 cents per gallon in Lewis (2011), who uses U.S. data
from 2004-2010. The exchange rate is the average US/CA exchange rate from 2007 reported by the Bank of
Canada, available online at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/exchange/exchange-rates-in-pdf/).
6C.1 in the appendix shows that the distribution of the median daily change in average prices
across markets has a large mass around zero and a non-negligible mass of markets in its left
tail.9 Under our -0.05 cpl cut-oﬀ rule, we classify 27 of the 110 markets in our sample as
cycling.
3.1 Market size, structure and the presence of price cycles
The top panel of Table 1 contains preliminary evidence of the relationship between market
size and the probability a location exhibits price cycles. A tabulation of our cycling indicator
across the quartiles of the population distribution suggests an “inverse-U” relationship: two
and seven markets in the ﬁrst and fourth quartiles exhibit price cycles, whereas both the
second and third quartiles have ten cycling markets. The bottom panel of Table 1 tabulates
our cycling indicator across the quartiles of the HHI distribution, revealing that the proba-
bility of observing price cycles is lower in more concentrated markets.10 The small number
of cycling markets in the bottom quartile of the population distribution and top quartile of
the HHI distribution largely corresponds to 15 markets that lie in the intersection of these
two groups. These are small, rural markets with only a few gas stations in our sample.
Motivated by the diﬀerences in retail prices’ response to changes in rack prices in Figures
1-3, we calculate the correlation between daily changes in average retail prices and rack
prices for each market, and see if these correlations vary with market size, structure and price
cycling status. We compute separate correlation coeﬃcients for days with positive changes
in rack prices and days with negative changes in rack prices. This allows for diﬀerences
across negative and positive wholesale cost shocks, possibly due to asymmetric passthrough.
While examining such correlation coeﬃcients does not constitute an exhaustive analysis of
passthrough, these correlations provide simple summary statistics that illuminate diﬀerences
9The companion appendix of additional ﬁgures and robustness checks for the results in this paper is online
at http://sites.google.com/site/dprbyrne/.
10Like Doyle et. al (2010) and Lewis (2011), we compute HHI by market in terms of station counts.
Hirschberg et. al (2003) highlight the important issue that HHI measures potentially lack comparability
across markets of diﬀerent size and with diﬀerent players. We have replicated all the ﬁndings in this paper
using their adjustment factors for HHI (p.140-141) that permit cross-market HHI comparisons, and ﬁnd
virtually no diﬀerences our results.
7in retail prices’ response to changes in rack prices across cycling and non-cycling markets,
and across urban and rural markets.11
Figures 4 and 5 plot the correlation coeﬃcients for negative and positive rack price
changes against the logarithm of markets’ population, distinguishing cycling markets (tri-
angles) from non-cycling markets (diamonds). The bottom left and top right corners of
both ﬁgures highlight two distinct clusters of non-cycling cities: small markets with low
correlations between daily changes in retail and rack prices (i.e., sticky pricing markets like
Goderich) and large markets with high correlations between daily changes in retail and rack
prices (i.e., cost-based pricing markets like Ajax). Cycling cities exhibit correlations that
are comparable to small non-cycling markets during negative rack price changes, and are
in between small and large non-cycling cities’ correlations for positive rack price changes.
Table 2 lists corresponding sample averages and standard deviations of the correlation coeﬃ-
cients across the quartiles of the population and HHI distributions. The top panel highlights
substantial diﬀerences in the average correlation coeﬃcient across markets in the top and
bottom quartiles of the population distribution of 0.658 and -0.022 for negative daily rack
price changes (similar for positive rack price changes). The bottom panel shows markets
in the top quartile of the HHI distribution exhibit substantially lower correlations between
daily changes in retail and rack prices. The main takeaway from Figures 4-5 and Table 2
is that collections of both small, highly concentrated sticky pricing markets and large, less
concentrated cost-based pricing markets exist in our sample.
A third potential determinant of price cycles is the geographic location and urban density
of markets. We highlight spatial patterns in the prevalence of price cycles by plotting the
11A full examination of passthrough in our sample is itself an extensive exercise that we leave for future
work with these data. As such, we do not make claims regarding the degree of asymmetric passthrough across
negative and positive daily changes in rack prices. Rather, we focus on diﬀerences in correlations in daily
changes in retail and rack prices across large/urban and small/rural non-cycling markets to establish the
existence of sticky and cost-based pricing markets in our sample. For formal investigations of wholesale price
passthrough in retail gasoline markets see Borenstein et. al (1997), Deltas (2008), Noel (2009) and Lewis
and Noel (2011). Borenstein et. al (1997) and Deltas (2008) ﬁnd gasoline stations passthrough wholesale
price increases faster than decreases. Noel (2009) highlights the importance of accounting for price cycles
in examining asymmetric passthrough, while Lewis and Noel (2011) further show passthrough is faster in
markets with price cycles.
8location of cycling (triangles) and non-cycling (diamonds) markets across Statistics Canada’s
2006 ten four-digit economic regions for Ontario in Figure 6.12 The cluster of large diamonds
around the “Golden Horseshoe” in Southern Ontario (i.e., from Toronto past Hamilton)
highlight a collection of urban non-cycling markets (such as Ajax).13 Overall, 19 (70.4
%) of the 27 cities in the top quartile of the population distribution lie in the Toronto,
Hamilton-Niagara or Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie economic regions. Among these 19 cities,
the average correlation coeﬃcient between daily changes in average retail and rack prices is
0.863 (s.d.=0.209) and 0.744 (s.d.=0.185) during negative and positive price changes. This
indicates that cost-based pricing is prevalent in this part of the province.
In contrast, small diamonds (i.e., the less populous non-cycling markets) are located in the
far less dense parts of the province along tertiary highways: in the Northeast and Northwest
economic regions, on the Bruce Peninsula and the Northern parts of the Kingston-Pembroke
economic region. Out of the 28 locations with populations in the bottom quartile of the
population distribution, 23 lie within these areas. Amongst these 23 markets relatively sticky
pricing exists as the average correlation coeﬃcients between daily changes in the average
retail and rack prices is only -0.016 (s.d.=0.120) and 0.038 (s.d.=0.069) during negative and
positive rack price changes.
As one moves away from the Toronto-Hamilton region, a larger fraction of cities exhibit
price cycles. Price cycling markets are predominant in markets along Lake Ontario around
Kingston in Eastern Ontario, in the Niagara Region toward the New York state border, and
12The 2006 economic region deﬁnitions (numbers) for Ontario are Ottawa (3510), Kingston-Pembroke
(3515), Muskoka-Kawarthras (3520) Toronto (3530), Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie (3540), Hamilton-Niagara
(3550), London (3560), Windsor-Sarnia (3570), Stratford-Bruce-Peninsula (3580), Northeast (3590) and
Northwest (3595). More information on these deﬁnitions can be found at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/subjects-
sujets/standard-norme/sgc-cgt/2006/2006-er-re-eng.htm
13Two non-cycling markets in these regions contrast ﬁndings from previous studies. Atkinson (2008a) ﬁnds
price cycles exist in Guelph, Ontario and nearby cities like Kitchener-Waterloo in 2005. Noel (2007b) shows
22 stations in Toronto for 131 days in 2001 exhibit weekly price cycles. We classify Guelph, Toronto and
their surrounding markets as non-cycling in our sample. We reaﬃrm our classiﬁcations by looking at market
level average prices and individual stations’ prices at daily frequencies in these cities graphically, ﬁnding
no evidence of asymmetric price cycles over our sample period like those in St. Thomas. The diﬀerence in
our ﬁndings possibly relates to Noel’s (2007a) ﬁnding that markets can transit into and out of price cycling
regimes over longer time horizons. His results are based on weekly data for 19 Canadian cities for just over
10 years. To date, no empirical results on these transitions based on daily station-level data exist.
9to the Southwest around Windsor and the Michigan border. Cycling cities also exist in the
northern parts of the province, but mainly in the northern cities along the Trans-Canada
highway such as Barrie (pop. 128,436), North Bay (pop. 53,970), Sudbury (pop. 157,855),
Sault Ste. Marie (pop. 74,950) and Thunder Bay (pop. 109,140).
Our ﬁnding of geographic clustering in pricing dynamics, particularly amongst the non-
cycling and cycling markets in the Southern Ontario, is consistent with our discussions
with industry experts and an actual gas station owner who both claim companies have
regional oﬃces that set pricing strategies across markets within diﬀerent regions. Houde and
Clark (2011) similarly report regional representatives exist for gasoline retailers in Qu´ ebec.
Atkinson (2008a) also ﬁnds evidence of regional pricing phenomena in Southern Ontario in
2005 amongst retail gasoline markets in Guelph, Kitchener, Cambridge and Waterloo.
3.2 Formal analysis of the determinants of price cycles
We formally study the relationship between the market size and structure, regional eﬀects
and the presence of price cycles by estimating the following linear-in-probability model:
1{PriceCycles}i = β0 +β1HHIi +β2ShareIndi + β3Popi +
10 X
j=1
β4j1{ERij} +Xiβ5 +ǫi (1)
where 1{PriceCycles}i is an indicator function equalling one if city i is classiﬁed as hav-
ing price cycles. HHIi is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index in terms of stations counts and
ShareIndi is the share of stations that are independents in city i.14 Popi is the population
of city i (in 100,000’s), 1{ERij} is a dummy variable equalling one if market i is in economic
region j, and Xi is a vector of market i demographic controls from the 2006 Census including
average household income, fraction of population who drive to work, fraction of population
14Lewis (2011) and Doyle et. al (2010) also use these market structure variables to investigate their
impact on the probability a city exhibits price cycles. Since we identify stations by whether we observe any
price reports for a station from one of the GasBuddy websites from 2007 to 2008, an important concern is
whether sample selectivity of certain brands or independents biases our market structure measures. Using
independently collected data from Kent Marketing Ltd., a primary distributor of data for the Canadian retail
gasoline market, on stations’ identities and characteristics for 67 markets in Ontario, we have veriﬁed for 46
markets that overlap between this sample and the GasBuddy sample that our market structure measures
accurately match those from Kent Marketing.
10with post-secondary education and urban density.
Estimation results
Regression coeﬃcient estimates for seven speciﬁcations of equation (1) are reported in
Table 3. Speciﬁcations (1)-(3) show a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between
HHI and the probability a city has price cycles. Interpreting the magnitude of the column
(3) estimates, a one-standard deviation increase in HHI of 0.275 reduces the probability a
location exhibits price cycles by 15.5%. This eﬀect is large relative to the 26.4% average
probability a market exhibit cycles in the sample. The share of independents has a positive,
though statistically insigniﬁcant relationship with the probability of cycling. There are mixed
and statistically insigniﬁcant estimates for the population slope coeﬃcients.
Speciﬁcation (4) adds the economic region dummy variables and remainder of demo-
graphic controls to the set of regressors. Beyond allowing us to investigate regional eﬀects
in cycling propensity, the inclusion of these dummies accounts for unobserved regional het-
erogeneity that likely confounds our market size and structure coeﬃcient estimates. The
estimates for the economic region dummies are consistent with the regional patterns dis-
cussed above. Markets in the Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie and Hamilton-Niagara
Regions have statistically signiﬁcant lower propensities to exhibit price cycles. Cities and
towns in the Kingston-Pembroke, Windsor-Sarina and the Northeast economic regions have
a signiﬁcantly higher propensity of having price cycles. We continue to ﬁnd a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant negative relationship between concentration and the probability
a market exhibits cycles after controlling for demographics and region-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Speciﬁcations (5)-(7) replace HHI, share independent and population with dummy vari-
ables that equal one if a market lies within a particular quartile of the HHI/ share in-
dependent/population distributions. For each speciﬁcation, the baseline group is the ﬁrst
quartile of the HHI/share independent/population distribution. The column (5) estimates
show markets in the top quartile of the HHI distribution have a signiﬁcantly lower probabil-
ity of exhibiting price cycles. All else equal, locations in the top quartile are 43% less likely
11to exhibit price cycles, whereas markets in the remaining three quartiles have stastically
indistinguishable diﬀerences in cycling propensity. The highly concentrated markets in the
top quartile include the 15 sticky pricing small rural markets discussed above. The column
(6) estimates do not indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the prevalence of price
cycling across markets in the share independent distribution.
Reﬂecting our ﬁndings from Table 1, the column (7) estimates show that markets in
the top three quartiles of the population distribution have a statistically signiﬁcantly higher
probability of price cycling relative to cities in the bottom quartile. Moreover, the “inverse-
U” relationship between city size and the probability of observing price cycles persists.
Intermediate-size cities in the third quartile of the population distribution are the most
likely to exhibit price cycles. The magnitude of the diﬀerences in cycling probability are
large compared to the 26.4% average cycling probability across cities: markets in the third
quartile are 14.8% and 9.7% more likely to exhibit price cycles than those in the second and
fourth quartiles. Only the prior diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, which
partly reﬂects the fact that we only have 90 degrees of freedom under speciﬁcation (7).
Two ﬁnal results from our column (5)-(7) estimates are worth noting. Market concen-
tration continues to have statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship with the probability
of price cycles. Even within the quartiles of the market size distribution we ﬁnd more
concentrated markets are less likely to exhibit price cycles. The marginal eﬀect of a one-
standard deviation increase in HHI falls to 10.1% under speciﬁcation (7), however is still
large at 38.3% of the average cycling probability across cities. Finally, markets located in
the Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie and Hamilton-Niagara economic regions continue to
have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of exhibiting price cycles.
Benchmarking ﬁndings to U.S. results
Previous studies of retail gasoline price cycles and their determinants across U.S. cities by
Doyle et. al (2010) and Lewis (2011) are important benchmarks for our analysis. Both papers
use daily station-level retail price data collected via consumers’ credit card transactions and
12other survey methods by Oil Price Information Service (OPIS). After controlling for state
ﬁxed eﬀects and market shares of various stations within markets in terms of station counts,
Lewis (2011), ﬁnds, as we do, a negative and positive relationship between HHI and the
share of independents, and the prevalence of price cycles across cities. However, only the
share of independents coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant in his regression, the opposite of
our ﬁnding. This suggests that market concentration eﬀects and share of independent eﬀects
are diﬃcult to separately identify once one accounts for region/state ﬁxed eﬀects. Doyle et.
al (2010) also ﬁnd cities with a larger share of independents are more likely to exhibit price
cycles. Similar to our results, they ﬁnd markets in the top quartile of their HHI distribution
are the least likely to exhibit price cycles, and that only cities in the third quartile have a
statistically higher probability of exhibiting price cycles (regression coeﬃcients relating the
level of HHI to the existence of price cycles are not reported). Our ﬁndings related to market
size, urban/rural diﬀerences and regional eﬀects in cycling propensity, which are obtained
from a completely diﬀerent data collection method and country, re-aﬃrm and build upon
these established ﬁndings from the U.S..
Robustness checks
Tables C.1 and C.2 of the appendix contain two additional sets of estimates that check
the robustness of our results to our classiﬁcation scheme for cycling cities. These robustness
checks replace the dependent variable with an indicator function equalling one if city i’s
median daily change in its average gasoline price is -0.025 and -0.075 cpl. The magnitude
and statistical signiﬁcance of the estimates in both sets of robustness results are similar to
our benchmark estimates. The results are more similar under the -0.075 cpl cut-oﬀ rule.
4 Price coordination and leadership in cycling cities
In this section we use our station-level data to characterize price cycles in cycling markets
and investigate the extent to which diﬀerent ﬁrms participate in price restorations and un-
dercut prices following a restoration. We restrict our empirical analysis to conservative daily
13frequencies as sample selection issues from GasBuddy spotters likely undermines any “real-
time” analysis of identifying exactly which stations are the ﬁrst to initiate price jumps during
restorations and undercut restoration prices.15 To facilitate comparisons across studies, we
follow the approach of Lewis (2011) throughout our analysis.
Identifying restorations
To study ﬁrms’ roles in the restoration and undercutting phases of price cycles, we must
ﬁrst identify restoration events. We use a cut-oﬀ rule to do so: a restoration day occurs if a
market’s median gasoline price increases by 1.5 cpl over consecutive days or over two days.
Under this deﬁnition, a single restoration period is either one or two days, allowing for the
possibility that some retailers restore their prices on day t while others restore their prices
when they open their stations on day t+1. In either event, the median price will reﬂect these
price changes on days t or t + 1 during a restoration. We use the inter-day changes in the
median rather than the average gasoline price within markets to avoid the impact of extreme
price observations in identifying restoration events. A station is classiﬁed as participating
in a restoration if its price is greater than or equal to the market’s median price on either
day one or two within a restoration period.16 Restoration days are set as “day zero” within
cycles. The length of a cycle is the number of days between the last restoration day of the
previous restoration period and the ﬁrst restoration day of the next restoration period. The
restoration price is computed as the maximum daily median price within a one or two day
restoration period.
Figure C.2 in the appendix illustrates how daily changes in median prices and our 1.5
cpl cut-oﬀ rule identiﬁes price restorations for St. Thomas. Restorations correspond to
15Atkinson (2008a)’s highlights the ineﬀectiveness of GasBuddy data in identifying the within-day timing
or price restorations and undercutting by stations.
16Lewis (2011) p.17 uses a somewhat diﬀerent restoration deﬁnition that also permits restorations to occur
over one or two days. He requires a minimum share of stations in a market to increase their prices by either
5 US cents per gallon (or 8 US cents in a robustness check) over a one or two day period for a restoration to
be established. In terms of CA cents per litre, these cut-oﬀ price changes are 1.41 cpl and 2.25 cpl (similar
conversions as above). We do not use a minimum participation rate in identifying price restorations since we
are concerned with potential measurement error due to sample selection issues with our internet-collected
GasBuddy data. Rather, we elect to use a conservative restoration identiﬁcation rule based on daily changes
in the median gasoline price with a market over time.
14the positive spikes in the daily median price that are suﬃciently large to pass the 1.5 cpl
horizontal cut-oﬀ line. A key concern in identifying restorations with changes in the median
price is that large daily changes in rack prices may generate large changes in retail prices and
hence the median retail price. An alternative metric to account for this is the change in the
daily median “margin” between stations prices and the rack price.17 We plot this series for
St. Thomas in Figure C.2 as well. Of course, large changes in the median price and margin
occur on the same day. However, there are many instances where large negative changes in
the rack price generate large margin diﬀerences that do not correspond to large, restoration-
driven daily changes in the median price. We have exhaustively investigated changes in the
median price and margin along these lines for our cycling locations and ﬁnd changes in the
less volatile median price is generally better at identifying restorations.
4.1 Characterizing price cycles
Table 4 contains various summary statistics that characterize price cycles across our
cycling markets. In total, our 1.5 cpl cut-oﬀ rule identiﬁes 910 cycles/restorations across our
cycling markets. The average price jump during restorations ranges from 3.45 (s.d.=1.69)
cpl in St. Catharines to 8.07 cpl in Brockville. The average cycle duration ranges from 5.06
days in Sault Ste. Marie to 10.17 days in Chatham. We ﬁnd locations’ HHI (logarithm
of population) is positively (negatively) correlated with their average price jump and cycle
duration, though all correlations are statistically insigniﬁcant. Restorations systematically
occur during the middle part of the week: across all restorations and markets, 260 (28.6%)
and 220 (24.2%) occur on Wednesday and Thursday. Restorations most frequently occur on
either Wednesday or Thursday in 25 of our 29 cycling markets.
We characterize the level and dispersion of prices amongst brand and independent stations
over the price cycle in Figures 7 and 8. Following Lewis (2011), these ﬁgures are constructed
by (1) computing the diﬀerence between stations’ daily prices and the last restoration price
17Denoting this diﬀerence as a “margin” is a slight abuse of language since we do not observe individual
stations’ rack price, only the average rack price of independents, implying we cannot compute the true
median margin.
15within their market; (2) computing box-and-whisker plots of this price diﬀerence by days
since the last restoration within each market; and (3) taking the average of the ﬁve compo-
nents of the box-and-whisker by days since last restoration across the cycling markets. The
ﬁgures therefore depict the average level and dispersion of prices amongst brand and inde-
pendent stations by days since last restoration across the 29 cycling markets, normalized by
the last restoration price within markets. Both ﬁgures show price dispersion amongst brand
and independent stations is minimized during restorations and gradually increases as price
cycles progress. Thus, restorations periods involve stations coordinating their prices, with
price dispersion subsequently rising as brands and independents undercut restoration prices.
Though the level and growth in price dispersion is comparable over price cycles amongst
brands and independents in Figures 7 and 8, the price levels are noticeably diﬀerent. On
average across cycling markets, brands’ median price diﬀerential from restoration prices is
zero during restoration periods while independents have a median price diﬀerential of about
-0.75 cpl.18 Thus, brands tend to set the restoration price and independents immediately
undercut it. Comparing the rate at which stations’ prices fall relative to the last restoration
price over the cycle, we see independent stations’ prices fall at a faster rate than brands
stations’ prices. By day seven of a cycle, brand and independent stations’ median price
is around -2.5 cpl and -3.4 cpl below the last restoration price. By day 14 of the cycle,
these brand and independent median price cuts are approximately -3.1 cpl and -4.1 cpl.
Overall, these ﬁgures provide preliminary evidence that independent stations are relatively
more aggressive in undercutting prices between restorations.
4.2 Firm participation in restorations
We estimate a linear-in-probability model to quantify ﬁrm-speciﬁc participation rates in
restorations. Speciﬁcally, we predict that gas station i participates in restoration τ according
18The use of “median” in this and the following three sentences is a slight abuse of language. The “median”
is technically the average across markets’ median price diﬀerential from the last restoration price by day of
the cycle.
16to the following regression equation:
1{Stni participates in Restτ}i = β0j +
J X
j=1
β1j1{Firmij} + ǫiτ (2)
where 1{Stni participates in Restτ}i is an indicator function equalling one if station i partic-
ipates in restoration τ, β0τ is a restoration ﬁxed eﬀect and 1{Firmij} is an indicator function
equalling one if station i is run by gasoline company j. We include ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummy
variables for each of the four brands and for seven independents/non-branded ﬁrms that
have suﬃciently many stations across markets to estimate a ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect (Canadian
Tire, Ultramar, Pioneer, Olco, 7-11, MacEwen, Mac’s). The remaining stations correspond
to other independent ﬁrms in the sample, which we treat as a single homogenous group,
and which serve as our baseline group for the remainder of the paper. The inclusion of
restoration-speciﬁc intercepts implies we use within-restoration variation in ﬁrms’ participa-
tion rates to estimate β1j ...βiJ, allowing us to recover ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects that are robust
to time and market-speciﬁc heterogeneity. To check the robustness of our estimates with
respect to the cut-oﬀ daily median price change that identiﬁes restorations we estimate (2)
using dependent variables that correspond to our baseline 1.5 cpl cut-oﬀ price, as well as 2
cpl and 2.5 cpl cut-oﬀ values.
Table 5 presents our coeﬃcient estimates under the three diﬀerent cut-oﬀ rules. All three
columns yield similar results both in terms the statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude of the
estimates, indicating that our results are robust to our restoration event cut-oﬀ rule. We
therefore focus on the estimates based on the 1.5 cpl cut-oﬀ rule. Consistent with the day 0
city-average box-and-whisker plots from Figures 7 and 8, we ﬁnd the four major brands are
more likely to be involved in restorations, whereas independents are less likely to restore their
prices. These diﬀerences are statistically and economically signiﬁcant: Esso, Shell, Petro-
Canada and Sunoco exhibit marginally higher restoration participation rates of 27.9%, 23.4%
30.9% and 21.3% relative to the baseline average participation rate of 31.3%. Conversely,
17Ultramar, Pioneer, MacEwen and Mac’s have signiﬁcantly lower participation rates that are
12.4%, 18.4%, 17.0% and 21.4% below the baseline participation rate. The remaining non-
branded stations do not exhibit signiﬁcantly higher or lower participation rates in restorations
with the exception of Canadian Tire stations. These stations are 11.3% more likely than the
baseline group to restore their prices during restorations. Given Canadian Tire is a large
distributor of hardware and automotive goods in Canada, it potentially uses its branding
advantage as a retailer to maintain market share while actively matching restoration prices.
4.3 Undercutting intensity by ﬁrms over price cycles
Recall from Figures 7 and 8 that brands set the level of restoration prices and are less
aggressive in undercutting than independents over the price cycle. We now formally measure
the extent to which stations operated by diﬀerent ﬁrms undercut restoration prices using a
regression model that allows for ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects in undercutting intensity. We normalize
prices with the last restoration price and compute PriceDiﬀitτ = Priceit − RestPriceτ, the
diﬀerence between station i’s price on date t and the last restoration price observed on date








1j 1{Firmij} + ǫit; τ < t < τ + 1 (3)
where the coeﬃcients have time superscripts as we allow for a diﬀerent coeﬃcient for each
day since the last restoration. Recall 1{Firmij} is an indicator function equalling one if
station i is operated by ﬁrm j. Thus, β
t−τ
1j measures how much ﬁrm j–run stations undercut
the last restoration price on average across cycling cities t − τ days following a restoration.
We present our parameter estimates for days one through seven since last restoration in
Table 6. One day following a restoration, Esso, Shell, Petro-Canada and Sunoco stations
have 0.63, 0.30, 0.60 and 0.43 cpl higher gasoline prices than the average price cut of 1.13
cpl, though Shell’s price diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero. As price
leaders in initiating price jumps, stations run by these brands shade up their prices relative
18to other stations in an attempt to maintain restoration price levels. As price cycles progress
on days two through seven after a restoration, the constant estimates in Table 6 show prices
fall to 1.44 to 3.22 cpl below the last restoration price on average. Over these days, brands’
coeﬃcients are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that brand-run stations undercut the
restoration price in a similar fashion to all other ﬁrms in a market. That is, these leading
ﬁrms simply following the cycle and are not aggressive in undercutting others during the
undercutting phase of price cycles.
The ﬁndings for independents’ stations starkly contrasts those of the brands. The day
after a restoration, on average stations run by Ultramar, Pioneer and Mac’s immediately
undercut the restoration price by an additional 0.58, 0.43 and 1.11 cpl beyond the market-
wide average price cut. These are statistically signiﬁcant and large average discounts of
51.5%, 37.9% and 98.2% relative to the day one average price cut of 1.13 cpl. For days two
through seven of a cycle, the estimates indicate that Ultramar, Pioneer, Olco and MacEwen
stations charge price diﬀerentials that are signiﬁcantly below the market-level average price
cut from the last restoration price in terms of both economic and statistical signiﬁcance
(at least at the 10% level). Two days following a restoration, Ultramar, Pioneer, Olco
and MacEwen undercut the restoration price 1.58, 1.10, 0.49, 0.76 cpl beyond the 1.44 cpl
average price cut. By day seven after a restoration, their prices are an additional 2.83,
1.43, 1.02 and 1.10 cpl below 3.22 cpl market-level average price cut. Ultramar is the most
aggressive of these three ﬁrms in undercutting prices: on average across our day one through
seven estimates its estimated price diﬀerential is 91.0% below the average restoration price
cut. For Pioneer, Olco and MacEwen these ﬁgures are 58.3%, 34.4% and 33.1%, indicating
that Pioneer-run stations are the second most aggressive undercutting stations followed by
Olco and then MacEwen. We jointly test the equality of the seven coeﬃcients across ﬁrms
and reject the null at the 5% level when comparing Ultramar to Olco or MacEwen, or
when comparing Pioneer to Olco or MacEwen. Statistically, Ultramar and Pioneer are the
19aggressive defectors from restoration prices and Olco and MacEwen are the less aggressive.19
A ﬁnal point of note from the results in Table 6 is that non-branded stations run by the
major hardware and automotive retailer, Canadian Tire, and the large convenience store
chain, 7-11, are are non-aggressive in undercutting prices over the cycle. In general, their
price cuts from the last restoration price do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the baseline market-
level average price cut. In fact, on days two, three and ﬁve of the cycle 7-11 stations have
statistically signiﬁcantly smaller price cuts relative to the baseline level. This suggests that
these retailers leverage their branding advantage from their core competencies to maintain
market share while charging higher retail gasoline prices over the cycle.
Robustness checks
The appendix contains robustness checks for the undercutting results, where we re-
estimate the regression model in (3) except we use cut-oﬀ rules based on 2 cpl and 2.5 cpl
one or two day changes in markets’ median price to identify restorations. The corresponding
robustness checks are listed in Tables C.3 and C.4 of the appendix. The estimates are very
similar in terms of magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance to those in Table 6, implying our
main conclusions regarding undercutting intensity are unchanged. We have estimated equa-
tions (2) and (3) under alternative deﬁnitions of cycling markets where we classify markets
as having cycles if their median daily change in average prices is less than -0.025 and -0.075
cpl. We also ﬁnd our results are also to how we classify cycling versus non-cycling markets.
Caveats
Given the potential selection biases in our the GasBuddy data, we raise some caution
over the interpretation of our ﬁndings. Returning to the sources of selection bias from
Atkinson (2008b), to the extent that independent stations are under-sampled relative to
brands by GasBuddy price spotters, and to the extent independent stations’ prices truly
19These ﬁndings are generally consistent with previous research that focus on the role of independents in
speciﬁc cities in Canada. Atkinson (2008a) ﬁnds Pioneer is the most aggressive undercutting ﬁrm in Guelph
Ontario using self-collected high frequency data from 2005. Eckert and West (2004) ﬁnd Pioneer plays a key
role in undercutting and generating price volatility in Ottawa, Ontario relative to Gatineau, Qu´ ebec using
daily price data from www.gastips.com from 2000.
20diﬀer from market-level average prices, our measures of price dispersion in Figures 7 and 8
likely underestimates the degree of price dispersion over price cycles.
To the extent that price spotters are more likely to report brands’ stations’ prices during
a restoration over independents’ prices (either due to the geographic location of brands’
vs. independents’ stations or pure branding eﬀects), our estimates of participation rates
for brands during restorations will likely be biased upward. Under this sample selectivity,
stations run by brands will have “too large” an inﬂuence in determining the daily median
price for a market relative to a random sample of stations’ prices within a day and market.
As a result, we will be more likely to observe instances where brands’ stations prices are
set at or above the median during restoration periods, implying they will be classiﬁed as
restoration participants “too-often.”
It is less clear how sample selection bias aﬀects the magnitude of our price undercut-
ting ﬁndings. It is unclear the extent to which GasBuddy spotters over- or under-sample
stations’ prices that are above or below the city-wide average price; one could make a case
for either. To the extent that brands (independents) truly undercut market level average
retail prices, over sampling of higher prices set by brand-run stations would tend to push
up (down) the magnitude of brands’ (independents’) undercutting estimates in equation
3. Over-sampling independents’ lower prices would tend to push down (up) independents’
(brands’) undercutting estimates.
5 Concluding remarks
The ﬁndings in this paper constitute a comprehensive analysis of price cycles, price
coordination and leadership in retail gasoline markets. We ﬁnd evidence of an inverse-U
relationship between market size and the presence of price cycles that is driven by the
existence of small, rural sticky pricing and large, urban cost-based pricing markets in the
lower and upper tail of the market size distribution. More concentrated markets are less
likely to exhibit price cycles, and cycling markets exist within one of three clusters in Eastern
21Ontario, the Niagara region and the Southwest toward Windsor, or amongst cities on the
Trans-Canada highway in the rural Northern part of the province. Within cycling cities,
we ﬁnd stations run by the major brands, Esso, Shell, Petro-Canada and Sunoco, tend
to coordinate their prices to initiate market-wide price jumps, and non-aggressively follow
market-level average prices over the undercutting phase of the cycle. In contrast, independent
stations tend not to participate in restorations and aggressively undercut prices during the
undercutting phase. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst non-U.S. analysis of price cycles,
price leadership and coordination using high-frequency retail gasoline prices for a large cross
section of markets. Another key point of diﬀerence is our access to data for small rural
markets that permits a novel examination of retail gasoline price dynamics in the lower tail
of the market size distribution.
Taken together, our ﬁndings from Sections 3 and 4 motivate future research on how
market structure and inventory behaviour aﬀect retail gasoline price dynamics. Within
Southern Ontario, our ﬁndings of price leadership and coordination within the intermediate-
sized markets around Kingston, Niagara Falls and Windsor show that brands can exploit
their relatively large networks of stations to periodically induce market-wide price jumps
and coordination in gasoline prices.20 However, our ﬁnding that price cycles cease to exist
in the large urban markets around Toronto and Hamilton suggests that beyond some point,
brands’ network size relative to the number of independent retailers is insuﬃcient to allow
them to inﬂuence market prices via price cycles. Competition in these markets leads to retail
prices that are tied to daily movements in wholesale prices (i.e., cost-based pricing).21
Within Northern Ontario, cities along the Trans-Canada highway exhibit price cycles,
however as markets shrink and become more concentrated, price cycles disappear and sticky
pricing equilibria prevail. Market structure and price coordination can also potentially ex-
plain these diﬀerences. Since brands’ stations are essentially the entire network within small
20We broadly deﬁne Northern Ontario to consist of the Northeast and Northwest economic regions, and
Southern Ontario to consist of all other economic regions.
21Houde and Clark (2011), p.8, similarly argue that brands’ network size relative to the number of het-
erogeneous independents is a key constraint that governs brands’ ability to lead market prices in Qu´ ebec.
22rural markets, price coordination amongst brands is easier to facilitate than within the
Northern cities where independent stations exist. The resulting lack of retail gasoline price
response to wholesale price changes in our rural markets, in the extreme, could be seen as
consistent with tacit collusion, as suggested by previous researchers (Borenstein and Shepard
(1996), Borenstein et. al (1997), Eckert and West (2005), among others).
A key diﬀerence in the comparison of cycling and non-cycling markets in Southern and
Northern Ontario is that the disparity in shipping route density around cycling and non-
cycling markets is much larger in the North. Northern cycling cities sit on a main shipping
route along the Trans-Canada highway through to Toronto whereas small non-cycling cities
are remote and lie on secondary highways. This contrasts the cycling and non-cycling mar-
kets in the South which generally lie within the Montreal-Windsor corridor along the dense
400-series Ontario provincial highways.22 This “diﬀerence in the diﬀerence” between cycling
and non-cycling cities in Southern and Northern Ontario suggests infrequent gasoline inven-
tory shipments may also contribute to nominal price rigidity in rural markets. Aguirregabiria
(1999) shows theoretically and empirically that the prevalence of large sunk inventory ship-
ping costs, like those incurred for sending fuel to remote markets, and a non-zero probability
of stock-outs can generate (S,s) pricing patterns similar to those in Figure 1 for Goderich
and among the Northern rural markets.23
Future research in applied theory that explains ﬁrms’ use of network size to inﬂuence and
coordinate market prices, and its interaction with market structure, is invaluable for further
explaining the diﬀerences in pricing dynamics across rural and urban markets found in this
paper. Empirical research that formally investigates the link between inventories and the
dynamics of retail gasoline prices along the lines of Aguirregabiria (1999) also represents an
important research frontier.
22A map of the 400-series provincial highways is provided in Figure C.3 in the online appendix.
23Another possibility is that station owners in rural markets primarily receive information on current
wholesale prices from their infrequent gasoline shipments with which they base their retail prices upon. Reis
(2006) shows this sort of costly and imperfect information acquisition over costs is also a micro-foundation
for nominal price rigidities amongst ﬁrms.
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Figure 4: Market Corr(Retail Price Change, Rack Price Change) vs. Market Size
Correlation During Negative Daily Rack Price Changes
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Figure 5: Market Corr(Retail Price Change, Rack Price Change) vs. Market Size
Correlation During Positive Daily Rack Price Changes
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Figure 7: Level and Variability of Brands’ Gas Prices over the Price Cycle
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Figure 8: Level and Variability of Independents’ Gas Prices over the Price Cycle
Box and Whisker Plots of Stations’ Prices Averaged Across Cycling Markets
28B Tables
Table 1: Cross Tabulation of Price Cycling Indicator, Market Size and Concentration
Pop. > 8775 Pop. > 25500 Pop. > 90190
Pop. ≤ 8775 Pop. ≤ 25500 Pop. ≤ 90190 Total
Non-Cycling City 26 18 17 20 81
Cycling City 2 10 10 7 29
Total 28 28 27 27 110
HHI > 0.134 HHI > 0.187 HHI > 0.280
HHI ≤ 0.134 HHI ≤ 0.187 HHI ≤ 0.280 Total
Non-Cycling City 16 19 22 24 81
Cycling City 12 8 8 1 29
Total 28 27 30 25 110
Notes: A market is classiﬁed as having price cycles if its median daily average price change is less than -0.05 cents
per litre. The threshold population values of 8,775, 25,500 and 90,190 correspond to the quartiles of the population
distribution across the 110 locations in the sample. HHI is computed in terms of station counts within a location.
The threshold HHI values of 0.134, 0.187 and 0.280 correspond to the quartiles of the HHI distribution across the
110 locations in the sample.
Table 2: Correlation Between Daily Retail and Rack Price Changes
(By Quartile of the Population and HHI Distributions)
Avg. Corr(Retail, Rack) Avg. Corr(Retail, Rack)
Negative Rack Changes Positive Rack Changes
Pop. Distribution
Q1 -0.022 (0.140) 0.049 (0.091)
Q2 0.125 (0.277) 0.194 (0.241)
Q3 0.351 (0.398) 0.357 (0.320)
Q4 0.658 (0.423) 0.599 (0.305)
HHI Distribution
Q1 0.286 (0.410) 0.313 (0.291)
Q2 0.438 (0.449) 0.451 (0.328)
Q3 0.282 (0.444) 0.318 (0.359)
Q4 0.072 (0.237) 0.085 (0.185)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Q# refers to the subset of markets
within the #th quartile of the population distribution in the top panel and the HHI (in terms
of station counts) distribution in the bottom panel.
29Table 3: Relationship Between Existence of Price Cycles, Market Structure and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HHI -0.618∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗ -0.411∗ -0.367∗∗
(0.137) (0.130) (0.139) (0.120) (0.192) (0.139)
Share Independent 0.109 0.092 0.012 -0.043 -0.011
(0.164) (0.156) (0.279) (0.305) (0.242)
Population -0.015 0.004 0.007 -0.008







Share Independent [Q2] -0.024
(0.090)
Share Independent [Q3] 0.091
(0.194)








ER: Ottawa -0.146 -0.174∗ -0.127 -0.187
(0.096) (0.092) (0.101) (0.107)
ER: Kingston-Pembroke 0.245∗ 0.206∗ 0.220∗ 0.132
(0.114) (0.107) (0.099) (0.085)
ER: Muskoka-Kawarthas -0.081 -0.160 -0.121 -0.231∗∗
(0.116) (0.120) (0.105) (0.091)
ER: Toronto -0.491∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.120) (0.106) (0.089)
ER: Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie -0.483∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.110) (0.109) (0.103)
ER: Hamilton-Niagara -0.308∗ -0.411∗∗ -0.422∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.133) (0.144) (0.121)
ER: London -0.048 -0.155 -0.088 -0.276∗∗
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.121)
ER: Windsor-Sarnia 0.296 0.189 0.211 0.101
(0.163) (0.132) (0.142) (0.109)
ER: Bruce Peninsula -0.036 -0.068 -0.048 -0.188∗∗
(0.075) (0.083) (0.079) (0.076)
ER: Northeast 0.253∗∗ 0.115 0.159∗ 0.047
(0.080) (0.073) (0.087) (0.059)
Demographic Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.155 0.150 0.154 0.356 0.357 0.359 0.448
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator function equalling one if a market’s median daily average price change is less
than -0.05 cents per litre. Number of observations is N =110. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at
the Statistic Canada 4-digit economic region level. ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
“Variable” [Qn] is a dummy variable that equals one if a city’s value for “Variable” lies in the nth quartile of the “Variable”
distribution across cities. ER: “Region Name” is a dummy variable that equals one if a city lies within the economic region
“Region Name.” Coeﬃcient estimates for additional controls including average household income, urban density, the fraction
of the population who drive to work and the fraction of the population with post-secondary education are not reported.
30Table 4: Price Cycle Summary Statistics for Cycling Markets
Economic Avg. Restoration Avg. Cycle
Region City/Town Pop. Price Jump Duration
Hamilton- St Catharines 131990 3.452 (1.688) 7.429 (5.946)
Niagara Niagara Falls 82185 3.880 (1.406) 7.000 (5.944)
Kingston- Kingston 117205 6.872 (1.903) 6.420 (1.907)
Pembroke Belleville 48825 5.540 (2.599) 7.732 (4.074)
Picton 25500 5.084 (2.843) 10.103 (5.453)
Brockville 21955 8.064 (3.245) 8.914 (4.985)
Napanee 15405 6.902 (2.299) 7.400 (4.643)
Brighton 10250 3.794 (1.843) 8.212 (4.917)
Gananoque 5285 5.609 (2.627) 8.000 (7.274)
London St Thomas 36110 6.044 (2.142) 9.120 (5.732)
Woodstock 35480 3.468 (1.555) 5.298 (3.094)
Muskoka- Orillia 30255 3.913 (2.013) 6.156 (4.557)
Kawarthas Huntsville 18280 4.819 (2.545) 8.852 (5.934)
Bracebridge 15650 5.982 (2.942) 8.625 (5.353)
Northeast Sudbury 157855 6.042 (2.405) 9.960 (5.870)
North Bay 53970 5.565 (2.047) 8.865 (4.523)
Sturgeon Falls 13410 5.261 (2.524) 9.720 (4.306)
Northwest Thunder Bay 109140 3.970 (2.643) 5.352 (4.153)
Sault Ste Marie 74950 4.022 (2.697) 5.056 (4.529)
Ottawa Cornwall 45965 4.247 (1.518) 8.735 (4.857)
Prescott 4180 6.910 (2.221) 8.868 (4.199)
Stratford- Stratford 30460 5.353 (2.255) 9.421 (6.336)
Bruce-Peninsula Owen Sound 21745 5.805 (2.278) 7.649 (5.224)
Port Elgin 11725 4.837 (1.849) 8.286 (4.567)
Windsor- Windsor 216470 5.286 (1.316) 7.043 (3.148)
Sarnia Chatham 108175 5.671 (2.185) 10.167 (6.644)
Wallaceburg 108175 4.391 (1.825) 8.056 (5.641)
Sarnia 71420 7.709 (3.009) 8.875 (6.354)
Essex 20030 4.155 (1.909) 9.400 (7.327)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. These statistics are based on 910 cycles identi-
ﬁed by a cut-oﬀ rule thats deﬁnes restorations as one or two day periods where a market’s median daily
price increases by more than 1.5 cpl.
31Table 5: Firm Participation in Restorations
1.5 cents/litre 2 cents/litre 2.5 cents/litre
Esso 0.279∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042)
Shell 0.234∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.049) (0.051)
Petro-Canada 0.309∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
Sunoco 0.213∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.045)
Canadian Tire 0.113∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.110∗
(0.060) (0.051) (0.057)
Ultramar -0.124∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.039) (0.042)
Pioneer -0.184∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Olco -0.053 0.017 -0.003
(0.080) (0.075) (0.091)
7-11 0.132 0.159 0.182
(0.124) (0.142) (0.123)
MacEwen -0.170∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗ -0.163∗∗
(0.060) (0.073) (0.071)
Mac’s -0.214∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗
(0.078) (0.067) (0.085)
Constant 0.313 0.250 -0.131
(0.236) (0.250) (0.091)
R2 0.157 0.170 0.169
N 8698 8155 7831
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator equalling one if a station sets its
price at or above the median price during a restoration period. Standard errors,
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city-brand level. ***, **, * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The column headers of
#.# cents/litre refer to a cut-oﬀ rule thats deﬁnes restorations as one or two
day periods where a market’s median daily price increases by more than #.#
cpl.
32Table 6: Firm Undercutting Aggressiveness by Day of Cycle
Days Since Last Restoration
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
Esso 0.632∗∗∗ 0.215 0.008 -0.063 -0.060 0.037 0.247
(0.160) (0.427) (0.528) (0.603) (0.678) (0.681) (0.630)
Shell 0.302 -0.174 -0.199 -0.317 -0.290 -0.219 -0.107
(0.203) (0.359) (0.481) (0.525) (0.602) (0.622) (0.651)
Petro-Canada 0.604∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.122 -0.431 -0.371 -0.277 0.182
(0.166) (0.252) (0.324) (0.359) (0.390) (0.501) (0.521)
Sunoco 0.431∗∗∗ -0.155 -0.226 -0.276 -0.320 -0.278 -0.217
(0.163) (0.355) (0.447) (0.530) (0.623) (0.730) (0.621)
Canadian Tire 0.121 -0.180 -0.236 -0.350 -0.534 -0.372 -0.320
(0.200) (0.378) (0.447) (0.459) (0.536) (0.629) (0.605)
Ultramar -0.583∗∗ -1.577∗∗∗ -1.981∗∗∗ -2.107∗∗∗ -2.370∗∗∗ -2.737∗∗∗ -2.834∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.569) (0.567) (0.617) (0.668) (0.673) (0.995)
Pioneer -0.429∗∗ -1.098∗ -1.252∗ -1.498∗∗ -1.637∗∗ -1.466∗ -1.428∗
(0.174) (0.609) (0.670) (0.668) (0.790) (0.857) (0.809)
Olco -0.185 -0.492∗∗ -0.811∗∗ -0.801∗ -1.081∗∗ -1.074∗ -1.021∗
(0.257) (0.235) (0.393) (0.411) (0.512) (0.562) (0.581)
7-11 0.127 0.588∗∗ 0.471∗∗ 0.362 0.599∗ 0.577 0.483
(0.163) (0.260) (0.221) (0.375) (0.353) (0.559) (0.457)
MacEwen -0.090 -0.756∗∗ -0.677∗∗ -0.560∗ -0.801∗∗ -1.294∗∗ -1.097∗
(0.143) (0.338) (0.325) (0.320) (0.380) (0.527) (0.655)
Mac’s -1.111∗∗∗ -0.782 -0.646 -0.341 -0.193 0.152 -0.012
(0.313) (0.513) (0.420) (0.431) (0.534) (0.451) (0.693)
Constant -1.131∗∗∗ -1.438∗∗∗ -1.900∗∗∗ -2.133∗∗∗ -2.577∗∗∗ -2.968∗∗∗ -3.216∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.130) (0.154) (0.151) (0.202) (0.242) (0.214)
R2 0.037 0.064 0.073 0.076 0.085 0.078 0.067
N 21622 10572 9355 8895 9208 7950 6066
Notes: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between a station’s price and the last restoration price where
restorations are identiﬁed as days where a market’s one or two day price diﬀerence is more than 2.5 cents per litre.
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the city-brand level. ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Figure C.2: Daily Diﬀerence in Median Retail Price and Median Margin in St. Thomas
34Figure C.3: 400 Series Highways in Southern Ontario
Highways Indicated by Solid Black Lines
35Table C.1: Relationship Between Existence of Price Cycles, Market Structure and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HHI -0.554∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗∗ -0.545∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.174 -0.225
(0.126) (0.126) (0.133) (0.128) (0.164) (0.164)
Share Independent 0.032 0.011 -0.117 -0.157 -0.077
(0.106) (0.112) (0.203) (0.203) (0.186)
Population -0.018 -0.004 -0.003 -0.020







Share Independent [Q2] -0.061
(0.114)
Share Independent [Q3] 0.118
(0.194)








ER: Ottawa -0.192∗ -0.178∗ -0.147 -0.208∗
(0.090) (0.088) (0.102) (0.094)
ER: Kingston-Pembroke 0.054 0.050 0.039 -0.016
(0.105) (0.102) (0.111) (0.089)
ER: Muskoka-Kawarthas -0.223∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.274∗∗ -0.311∗∗
(0.110) (0.115) (0.103) (0.104)
ER: Toronto -0.498∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.117) (0.131) (0.112)
ER: Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie -0.496∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.702∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.114) (0.115) (0.113)
ER: Hamilton-Niagara -0.328∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.488∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.142) (0.157) (0.130)
ER: London -0.054 -0.142 -0.105 -0.265∗∗
(0.105) (0.109) (0.112) (0.119)
ER: Windsor-Sarnia 0.141 0.095 0.032 -0.047
(0.151) (0.131) (0.139) (0.113)
ER: Bruce Peninsula -0.089 -0.091 -0.104 -0.163
(0.081) (0.090) (0.083) (0.095)
ER: Northeast 0.233∗∗ 0.111 0.100 0.037
(0.080) (0.079) (0.089) (0.074)
Demographic Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.135 0.127 0.140 0.285 0.292 0.323 0.379
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator function equalling one if a market’s median daily average price change is less
than -0.05 cents per litre. Number of observations is N =110. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at
the Statistic Canada 4-digit economic region level. ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
“Variable” [Qn] is a dummy variable that equals one if a city’s value for “Variable” lies in the nth quartile of the “Variable”
distribution across cities. ER: “Region Name” is a dummy variable that equals one if a city lies within the economic region
“Region Name.” Coeﬃcient estimates for additional controls including average household income, urban density, the fraction
of the population who drive to work and the fraction of the population with post-secondary education are not reported.
36Table C.2: Relationship Between Existence of Price Cycles, Market Structure and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HHI -0.568∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.550∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.123) (0.129) (0.124) (0.188) (0.116)
Share Independent 0.124 0.108 0.055 -0.003 -0.007
(0.194) (0.186) (0.295) (0.316) (0.260)
Population -0.014 -0.001 0.002 -0.006







Share Independent [Q2] 0.027
(0.115)
Share Independent [Q3] 0.094
(0.216)








ER: Ottawa 0.018 -0.024 0.022 -0.028
(0.083) (0.090) (0.095) (0.101)
ER: Kingston-Pembroke 0.318∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.098) (0.100) (0.088) (0.082)
ER: Muskoka-Kawarthas 0.088 0.024 0.071 -0.066
(0.103) (0.123) (0.097) (0.092)
ER: Toronto -0.295∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.120) (0.096) (0.072)
ER: Kitchener-Waterloo-Barrie -0.287∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.106) (0.093) (0.090)
ER: Hamilton-Niagara -0.093 -0.177 -0.148 -0.281∗∗
(0.116) (0.134) (0.131) (0.115)
ER: London 0.140 0.050 0.115 -0.057
(0.088) (0.099) (0.092) (0.102)
ER: Windsor-Sarnia 0.497∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗
(0.146) (0.137) (0.136) (0.111)
ER: Bruce Peninsula 0.118∗ 0.091 0.111 -0.031
(0.065) (0.083) (0.068) (0.074)
ER: Northeast 0.359∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗
(0.072) (0.080) (0.085) (0.066)
Demographic Controls N N N Y Y Y Y
R2 0.137 0.132 0.136 0.308 0.293 0.292 0.363
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator function equalling one if a market’s median daily average price change is less
than -0.05 cents per litre. Number of observations is N =110. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at
the Statistic Canada 4-digit economic region level. ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
“Variable” [Qn] is a dummy variable that equals one if a city’s value for “Variable” lies in the nth quartile of the “Variable”
distribution across cities. ER: “Region Name” is a dummy variable that equals one if a city lies within the economic region
“Region Name.” Coeﬃcient estimates for additional controls including average household income, urban density, the fraction
of the population who drive to work and the fraction of the population with post-secondary education are not reported.
37Table C.3: Firm Undercutting Aggressiveness by Day of Cycle
Days Since Last Restoration
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
Esso 0.647∗∗∗ 0.218 -0.040 -0.040 -0.056 0.024 0.300
(0.162) (0.383) (0.528) (0.623) (0.674) (0.687) (0.691)
Shell 0.318 -0.079 -0.251 -0.292 -0.342 -0.276 -0.158
(0.215) (0.340) (0.483) (0.530) (0.590) (0.585) (0.680)
Petro-Canada 0.655∗∗∗ 0.079 -0.124 -0.440 -0.366 -0.317 0.111
(0.173) (0.243) (0.320) (0.358) (0.380) (0.497) (0.546)
Sunoco 0.488∗∗∗ -0.120 -0.260 -0.283 -0.314 -0.372 -0.152
(0.163) (0.350) (0.466) (0.502) (0.602) (0.764) (0.668)
Canadian Tire 0.135 -0.228 -0.251 -0.373 -0.541 -0.402 -0.292
(0.188) (0.395) (0.441) (0.472) (0.535) (0.610) (0.638)
Ultramar -0.495∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗ -2.056∗∗∗ -2.074∗∗∗ -2.338∗∗∗ -2.729∗∗∗ -2.862∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.519) (0.549) (0.617) (0.646) (0.629) (1.018)
Pioneer -0.377∗∗ -1.055∗ -1.224∗ -1.489∗∗ -1.649∗∗ -1.553∗ -1.406
(0.166) (0.602) (0.661) (0.673) (0.776) (0.830) (0.871)
Olco -0.069 -0.388∗∗ -0.823∗ -0.845∗ -0.958∗ -1.046∗ -0.993
(0.244) (0.156) (0.430) (0.459) (0.543) (0.561) (0.607)
7-11 0.077 0.749∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.359 0.604∗ 0.575 0.543
(0.179) (0.310) (0.221) (0.385) (0.351) (0.548) (0.465)
MacEwen -0.067 -0.699∗∗ -0.679∗ -0.529 -0.786∗ -1.305∗∗ -0.970
(0.149) (0.334) (0.364) (0.333) (0.401) (0.513) (0.747)
Mac’s -1.063∗∗∗ -0.721 -0.676 -0.451 -0.295 0.045 -0.043
(0.326) (0.505) (0.465) (0.486) (0.492) (0.471) (0.632)
Constant -1.147∗∗∗ -1.474∗∗∗ -1.879∗∗∗ -2.135∗∗∗ -2.555∗∗∗ -2.957∗∗∗ -3.292∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.128) (0.160) (0.160) (0.198) (0.242) (0.241)
R2 0.035 0.068 0.073 0.075 0.083 0.076 0.067
N 20382 10033 9036 8691 9058 8100 6093
Notes: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between a station’s price and the last restoration price where
restorations are identiﬁed as days where a market’s one or two day price diﬀerence is more than 2 cents per litre.
Standard errors, reported parentheses, are clustered at the city-brand-restoration level. ***, **, * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
38Table C.4: Firm Undercutting Aggressiveness by Day of Cycle
Days Since Last Restoration
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
Esso 0.627∗∗∗ 0.249 -0.028 -0.084 0.028 0.044 0.338
(0.166) (0.371) (0.539) (0.621) (0.665) (0.706) (0.691)
Shell 0.332 -0.009 -0.261 -0.292 -0.281 -0.302 -0.161
(0.207) (0.321) (0.489) (0.526) (0.592) (0.585) (0.665)
Petro-Canada 0.642∗∗∗ 0.113 -0.119 -0.457 -0.329 -0.280 0.033
(0.178) (0.227) (0.331) (0.345) (0.365) (0.492) (0.534)
Sunoco 0.495∗∗∗ -0.105 -0.272 -0.262 -0.282 -0.261 -0.170
(0.167) (0.328) (0.492) (0.491) (0.582) (0.724) (0.726)
Canadian Tire 0.128 -0.224 -0.322 -0.388 -0.512 -0.430 -0.219
(0.190) (0.373) (0.477) (0.456) (0.514) (0.624) (0.621)
Ultramar -0.483∗∗ -1.609∗∗∗ -2.062∗∗∗ -2.058∗∗∗ -2.309∗∗∗ -2.698∗∗∗ -2.874∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.495) (0.544) (0.585) (0.604) (0.636) (0.966)
Pioneer -0.360∗∗ -1.040∗ -1.235∗ -1.490∗∗ -1.608∗∗ -1.590∗ -1.467∗
(0.163) (0.584) (0.670) (0.652) (0.763) (0.814) (0.857)
Olco -0.004 -0.367∗∗ -0.773∗ -0.898∗∗ -0.796 -1.049∗ -0.943
(0.215) (0.169) (0.456) (0.448) (0.514) (0.594) (0.608)
7-11 0.051 0.829∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.350 0.607∗ 0.545 0.746
(0.186) (0.332) (0.208) (0.415) (0.345) (0.476) (0.465)
MacEwen -0.087 -0.726∗∗ -0.728∗∗ -0.537∗ -0.751∗ -1.322∗∗∗ -0.957
(0.151) (0.313) (0.344) (0.318) (0.396) (0.503) (0.712)
Mac’s -1.053∗∗∗ -0.494 -0.419 -0.377 0.008 0.317 0.228
(0.327) (0.520) (0.428) (0.522) (0.454) (0.446) (0.551)
Constant -1.115∗∗∗ -1.478∗∗∗ -1.899∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗∗ -2.597∗∗∗ -2.959∗∗∗ -3.327∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.132) (0.162) (0.158) (0.199) (0.243) (0.242)
R2 0.034 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.085 0.078 0.068
N 19536 9652 8721 8490 8801 7983 6027
Notes: The dependent variable is the diﬀerence between a station’s price and the last restoration price where
restorations are identiﬁed as days where a market’s one or two day price diﬀerence is more than 2.5 cents per litre.
Standard errors, reported parentheses, are clustered at the city-brand-restoration level. ***, **, * indicate statistical
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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